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THE LITTLE AGENCY THAT COULD
Sallyanne Payton*
REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE. By
Robert A. Kagan. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1978. Pp.
xi, 200. $10.

The first observation that must be made about this modest
and insightful book is that its title verges on deceptive labeling. 1
Regulatory Justice is not a comprehensive treatment of the problems of legality in the administrative process; it is not even an
exhaustive analysis of the problems of fair enforcement of the
wage-price freeze of 1971. It is, rather, a carefully rendered account of the process of rule formulation and interpretation as
viewed from the vantage point of the General Counsel's Office of
the Office of Emergency Preparedness, in which Kagan served as
an attorney during the freeze. Robert Kagan is both a lawyer and
a social scientist; 2 his research method was that of the
participant-observer. He has thus given us a fine insider's view
of the rule-making process, one perhaps unsurpassed in the literature. The book is rich in conceptual understanding and wellchosen example. The fact is, however, that the freeze was in effect
so briefly that most of the truly interesting problems of regulatory
administration did not have time to mature within the freeze
agencies. Regulatory Justice gives us a simple story, a purified
example of basic regulatory process, that can help us greatly in
understanding the more complex phenomena with which we must
customarily deal.
The purpose of the freeze was straightforward. In the judgment of the national political leadership, inflation was out of
hand in 1971 and threatening to get worse. The previous year,
Congress had passed the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan, B.A. 1964, LL.B. 1968, Stanford University.
1. The practice of giving expansive titles to modest monographs can produce some
striking incongruities. I have on my shelf a work whose dust jacket edge proclaims grandly
its subject, "Jurisprudence and Statecraft." On closer examination, it turns out to be an
account of the brief passage of the Wisconsin Development Authority. S. MERMIN, JURISPRUDENCE AND STATECRAFr: THE WISCONSIN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND !TS IMPLICATIONS

(1963).
2. The dust jacket announces that Kagan holds a Ph.D. in sociology from Yale. He
is presently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley.
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granting to President Nixon startlingly broad powers "to issue
such orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries . . . ." 3 The President was
not anxious to use this authority; his vigorously expressed distaste for wage and price controls arose out of both his conservative
political philosophy and his personal experience as a lawyer for
the Office of Price Administration during World War II. He resisted the imposition of economy-wide controls until it became
apparent that even the business community favored them.~
When the President finally acted, however, he issued a dramatic order. On prime-time television, the evening of August 16,
1971, the President announced: "I am today ordering a freeze on
all prices and wages throughout the United States . . . ." He
promised government enforcement without "a huge price control
bureaucracy. " 5
The President had ordered the inflationary spiral to stop
dead in its tracks. 6 But secrecy in developing the President's action had made it impossible to plan the actual implementation
of the program: administration thus had to be improvised. No
large new agency could be created, and primary authority could
not be given to an existing agency with speciai interest constituencies. The President himself needed to be insulated from
individual decisions, but the agency administering the freeze
had to be clearly identified with the President.
Out of these imperatives emerged the Cost of Living Council
3. Act of Aug. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, §202, 84 Stat. 799. President Nixon used
the Act once before the freeze, to create the Construction Industry Stabilization Committee (CISC), part of an effort to slow down wage and price increases in the construction
industry. When Congress extended the Act in May 1971, it also provided that the President could not single out a "particular industry or segment of the economy" unless he
determined that prices or wages in that industry or segment had risen at a rate that was
"grossly disproportionate" to rises in the economy generally. Act of May 18, 1971, Pub.
L. 92-15, §3, 85 Stat. 38. The official history of the freeze is N. YOSHPE, J. ALLUMS, J.
RUSSELL & B. ATKIN, STEMMING INFLATION: THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
THE 90-DAY FREEZE (1972) [hereinafter cited as YosHPE.]
4. For an account of the political and economic background of the freeze, see A.
WEBER, IN PURSUIT OF PRICE STABILITY: THE WAGE-PRICE FREEZE OF 1971, at 1-9 (1973).
5. Nixon, The Challenge of Peace, 7 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES, Doc. 1168, 1170 (Aug.
23, 1971) (text of the President's radio and television address of Aug. 15, 1971).
6. The symbolic impact of the word "freeze" was stunning. It easily drew on the
familiar physical experience with things frozen, motionless, stiff. But it also implied
sudden stopping-as in equally familiar movie images of gunmen oursting into bars or
banks and shouting "Alright, everybody freeze!" The metaphor itself created public expectations of how the stabilization policy would be administered. (It is interesting to
speculate on what greater administrative flexibility is implied by the word "stabilization"
than by the word "freeze.")
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(CLC), composed of Cabinet-level officials, whose Executive
Director was also designated Special Assistant to the President. 7
For operating responsibilities the CLC turned to the Office of
Emergency Preparedness (OEP), which was already housed in
the Executive Office of the President. The OEP was primarily
responsible for civil defense planning but also dealt with natural
disasters. It was thus blessed with a short-term crisis orientation,
a neutral political image, good contacts with state and local governments and major industries, and a nationwide communications system. It was thinly staffed, however, and thus had to
borrow most of its freeze personnel from other agencies. In the
field, its own slender resources were augmented by the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) field offices and, for rural areas, the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service. For its headquarters operation as well, it borrowed widely throughout the
government.
For three months, this odd collection of commandeered regulators fulfilled the President's promise: they enforced a freeze.
They held the line against the appeals and temptations of individualized justice, allocative efficiency, pressure group politics,
natural sympathy, and a sense of proportion. General Motors, the
unions, antique dealers, and the Girl Scouts8 were all frozen together. At the end of November 1971, when the regulators went
back to their other lives, the rise in the consumer price index had
been trimmed to an annualized rate of 1.6%, the index of average
hourly earnings for employees in manufacturing had risen at an
annual rate of only 0.6%, and the wholesale price index was actually declining at an annual rate of almost 0.4%.
Why did the freeze turn out so well,9 when the history of
7. The members of the CLC were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(0MB), the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, the Special Assistant to
the President for Consumer Affairs, the Secretaries of Agriculture, L~bor, Commerce, and
Housing and Urban Development. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System was designated special Adviser to the Council. The Executive Director of
the CLC was Arnold R. Weber, a University of Chicago economist who had been serving
as an Associate Director of the 0MB. Weber has written a fine memoir of the freeze. See
A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 20-27. The Director of the OEP was General George A. Lincoln,
a retired Army general who had taught economics at West Point for 22 years and had spent
his career in security and strategic planning. See id. at 99-105; YosHPE, supra note 3, at
21-22.

8. Kagan's account of the Girl Scout episode alone is worth the price of the book and
the time to read it. See R. KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE 119-21, 152 (1978) (hereinafter cited
by page numbers only).
,.
9. Arnold Weber has had some second thoughts about the wisdom of a freeze as
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regulation is a history of agencies gone soft, regulators being captured, public attention wandering away from regulatory issues,
political support falling away from agency zealots? As Kagan tells
it, the answer is that the freeze, and the freeze agencies, were
unique.
First, the people in the freeze agencies had not committed
themselves to careers as wage-price regulators. The members of
the Cost of Living Council all had major management responsibilities for ongoing government functions. For the OEP itself, the
freeze was just another assignment to short-term domestic crisis
management that had to be carried out simultaneously with its
principal missions. The OEP's borrowed staff members also had
primary attachments to their home agencies. Kagan describes
"this hastily assembled pickup team" as "reasonably welleducated but not brilliant, neither dedicated nor hostile to the
idea of wage-price controls, without prior knowledge of the subject, and without ambition for careers in the presumably temporary program." 10 Other agencies, and other regulators, would
carry out subsequent phases of the stabilization program after the
freeze had ended.
Second, both policy and politics allowed the agencies to treat
the freeze as a problem of enforcing a stringent rule whose single
purpose was to halt wage and price increases. 11 Although the explicit words of the Executive Order were not dramatic, 12 the public rhetoric and administration of the freeze were intended to have
"hard" as the one that was imposed. See A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 126-29. He acknowledges, however, that the performance of OEP and IRS was "something of a bureaucratic
miracle." Id. at 128.
10. P. 24.
11. The CLC's interpretation of the term "transaction" indicates most clearly the
commitment to stringency. Many increases in prices, wages, and fringe benefits had
previously been scheduled to go into effect after August 15, 1971. In many cases, contracts
had been signed and preliminary performance had begun. The CLC held that no
"transaction" had occurred unless the employee had worked at the higher rate, the goods
had been delivered by the seller, or the rental unit had been occupied (pp. 52-56). See A.
WEBER, supra note 4, at 57-58. This interpretation ran counter to contract law principles,
vernacular understandings of when someone "has" something, and widely held notions of
justice, at least on the part of persons whose legitimate expectations were defeated. In
December 1971, as a result of vigorous lobbying by labor unions and teachers' organiza•
tions, the Congress explicitly permitted most frozen pay increases to go into effect retroactively. See A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 127.
12. Executive Order No. 11615 provided that prices and wages "shall be stabilized
. • . at levels not greater than those pertaining to a substantial volume of actual transactions . . . during the 30-day period ending August 14, 1971, for like or similar commodities
or services." The order exempted "raw agricultural products." 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (Aug,
17, 1971).
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"a shock effect on expectations," to buy time while the Administration developed a more comprehensive policy. The OEP and the
CLC decided to preserve as many policy options as possible for
the subsequent phases of the program, a strategy that required
that the freeze raise few if any expectations of favored treatment
for particular groups, interests, or philosophies. For example,
freeze policy could have allowed generous treatment for lowincome wage-earners 13 or special hardship consideration for businesses that had received cost increases just before the freeze went
into effect but were prevented by the freeze from passing them
along to their customers. If the freeze agencies had recognized
such claims, however, they would have reduced the public's expectation of a halt to inflation (thereby detracting from th_eir own
mission) and would have created an expectation that subsequent
phases of the program would recognize the same claims (thereby
tying the hands of their successor agencies). The freeze agencies
therefore had good reason not to accommodate values, even
widely shared ones, that competed with the dominant goal of
stringency. Any inequities or distortions in individual cases were
justified by the overall salutary effect of the freeze and were, in
any event, temporary.1 4
Third, the enforcement of a stringent rule was politically and
economically feasible. Because the economy was in a slack period, no severe hardships or shortages developed. The freeze did
not become a partisan political issue. Although Kagan does not
deal with politics, it bears noting that the freeze was a Democratic policy put into effect by a Republican administration; the
national political leadership was thus united on the need for the
freeze, if not always on specific strategies and tactics. For ninety
days, the country was willing to accept a stringent rule, and the
agencies were structured so that application of a simple stringent
rule was a satisfying short-term assignment for the heterogeneous
staff assembled for the purpose.
Simple commands may be hard to carry out. The freeze purported to cover nearly every transaction involving wages or
prices 15 in a complicated economy. There were tens of millions of
13. Eventually the CLC exempted wage increases that would have brought workers
up to minimum wage standards of general applicability. See A. WEBER, supra note 4, at
46, 75-76.
14. Id. at 36.

15. The CLC read the term "price" to include voluntacy association dues, the term
"wages" to include fringe benefits of all kinds, the term "rent" to include college dormitory fees. On the other hand, it refused to assimilate to the terms such items as dividends,
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such transactions every day, almost all of them between consenting adults. The freeze officials quickly perceived that success
depended upon voluntary compliance, which would only be
achieved if citizens could find out, easily and quickly, just what
was expected of them. Citizens also had to believe that their
sacrifices were being reciprocated by others in a great universal
rising to the occasion. The most promising way to administer the
freeze, therefore, was to announce simple, clear, and specific
rules, develop a mechanism for answering individual inquiries
quickly and authoritatively, and adhere to a policy of uniform
rule application. These formalities were accompanied by boundless public exhortation on the part of government officials. It is
important, particularly for lawyers, to understand that the freeze
was mainly administered through the dissemination of information rather than enforced through official investigation and prosecution. The freeze agencies conceived of their task primarily as a
venture in governance rather than law enforcement.
The core of Regulatory Justice is a description of how the
freeze agencies developed a regime of rules during the ninety-day
period. No law compelled them to do so. The Economic Stabilization Act contained no standards to guide presidential discretion,
except the direction that the policies had to be universal unless
the President had superior justification for treating industries or
segments of the economy unequally. The Executive Order particularized the command only by giving the CLC a date around
which to freeze wages and prices. Both the Act and the Executive
Order were silent on whether the Administrative Procedure Act
applied, 16 and they provided no independent procedural guidcorporate profits, welfare payments, and local taxes. Executive Order 11615 did not cover
interest rates, which declined during the freeze, as expected. Kagan suggests that the CLC
decided that the freeze did not apply to interest rates (p. 50-51). Weber gives a fuller
explanation, but also says that the CLC itself debated the point. A. WEBER, supra note 4,
at 38-39. However, Yoshpe quotes a statement by Treasury Secretary Connally on August
15, 1971, just before the President's freeze announcement, to the effect that the planning
group had decided to exclude interest rates. YosHPE, supra note 3, at 17-18.
16. It is not at all clear just how the freeze agencies' activities would be viewed under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Most of their actions consisted of informal jaw•
boning, exhortation, public shaming. See 86 HARV. L. REV.1380, 1403-06 (1973). Executive
Order 11615 required a good deal of interpretation. After the CLC delegated to the OEP
the authority to "implement, administer, monitor and enforce" the freeze (CLC Order No,
1, Aug. 17, 1971), the OEP Director, General Lincoln, issued Economic Stabilization
Regulation 1, defining most of the key terms. The regulation itself was clearly an
"interpretative rule" within the meaning of the APA. It was amended five times. For even
more particularized guidance there were the Economic Stabilization Circulars, which
crystallized policy decisions that had been made in the context of individual cases. The
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ance. Neither the CLC nor the OEP promulgated procedural regulations. The courts largely deferred to the agencies on matters
of substance, 17 and only one court purported to impose procedural
requirements: Judge Leventhal, in the course of upholding the
freeze against objections founded on the nondelegation doctrine,
held that the judicial review and rule-making provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act applied to freeze activities. 18 Since
the agencies were by that time proceeding almost entirely by
informal action and interpretative advice, the imposition of the
formal core of administrative law upon their activities had little
tangible effect, though it might have served as a reminder to
seasoned intuitions that the federal judiciary would not tolerate
obvious abuses of administrative discretion.
For all practical purposes, therefore, the freeze agencies were
law unto themselves with. respect to both substance and procedure. The agencies were in theory free· to devise whatever rules
they liked, subject to judicial review only for rationality; the public had no opportunity to participate iri makingthe rules; individual citizens who wished to challenge the agencies' interpretations
of their authority had to run the risk of defending an enforcement
action in order to be certain of being heard. The situation, so
described from the standpoint of administrative law, sounds like
the nightmare of delegation run riot. 19 But no ~isaster ensued. All
the practical pressures pushed the· agencies tow~d. consistency
and uniformity, toward a rule-bound legality. The freeze was
administered by officials who believed th~t the program would be
viewed by the people as legitimate, and therefore would succeed,
only if it were based on a set of apparently rational rules that were
being applied universally, uniformly, and fairly. If there _was a
danger in these agencies, it was that legality might bleed into its
excess, legalism, not that uncontrolled discretion might lead to
courts treated these as interpretative rules. In addition, the .agencies issued hundreds of
opinion letters. See Gellhorn, The Legal Effect of Anti-Inflation Aduice from Government
Agencies, PRAc. LAW., Dec. 1971, at 13.
17. The government filed suit against violators in only eight cases, selected mainly
for their symbolic value. The government itself was sued in 37 cases. Most of the cases
had not been decided by the time the freeze ended; of the eight that had, the government
had won six and lost two. For an account of the freeze agencies' enforcement tactics, see
A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 84-98; YcisHPE, supra note 3, at 117-42.
18. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971).
19. Kagan notes that "there was in fact no significant interference by the courts with
the over four hundred rules and thousands of individual rulings issued by the administrative agencies which were regulating the central economic decisions of millions of corporations and business firms across the whole nation" (p. 123).
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enforcement by whim.
The most important source of reinforcement for the agencies'
standards of legality was the program's need for public support,
which could only be gained if the press accorded the freeze both
extensive news coverage and at least mild editorial approval. The
price of press coverage is press scrutiny; the national press reported agency rulings throughout the duration of the program
and was alert to charges of inconsistency or favoritism. Unlike
most regulatory agencies, therefore, the CLC and the OEP did
not recede into obscurity during the life of their program. The fact
of daily exposure to powerful news agencies sharpened the agencies' desire to administer the freeze in a way that would be
broadly perceived as fair. "Fairness," however, quickly came to
mean fair rules. Particular cases were viewed as occasions to
make or apply rules, not as opportunities to do individualized
justice. The administrative techniques of the agencies reflected
these objectives: the agencies wished to be able to tell inquirers
promptly what rule governed their case. The transmission of the
information was to be individualized; the content of the information itself was not.
The danger of governing through a body of written rules is
that the officials who interpret them may not be aware of, or may
ignore, the purposes that individual rules, or the body of rules,
are designed to serve. The rules· then take on a life of their own
through the elaboration of the conventional meanings of their
words, divorced from purpose and direction. This phenomenon is
generally called "legalism." It seems inevitable that a good deal
of it must have occurred in the freeze operation: with over 360 IRS
and OEP field offices receiving in excess of 800,000 inquiries,
some of the advice given must have been mistaken or unnecessarily rigid. On the other hand, the stringency of the freeze tended
to encourage legalism: when in doubt, it was best for an official
answering an inquiry to err on the side of deciding that the price
or wage increase was frozen, without close inquiry into the economic goals undergirding the program. The field forwarded to the
OEP national office only 1,100 questions that they were unable
to answer, 20 most of which involved requests for exception or exemption.21 The OEP General Counsel functioned as the agencies'
20. See YoSHPE, supra note 3, at 68-69.
21. The initial rules themselves excepted raw agricultural products, school tuitions,
stocks and bonds, and exports. Most of the CLC rulings thereafter elaborated on the
boundaries of the initial exceptions, mainly in order to confine the reach of economic or
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court of appeals with respect to difficult questions of rule interpretation.
Within the OEP General Counsel's office the problem of informing the borrowed staffers of the agency's purpose and the
problem of maintaining rationality in rule application were both
solved by a single technique: staff members were encourged to
consult one another when they were in doubt about the proper
handling of a question. 22 Colleagues consulted among themselves;
disagreement or uncertainty on a question resulted in referring it
to the next superior level, all the way to the OEP General Counsel
himself, who would try to divine what the CLC itself would do
with the issue. Where significant doubt remained, the CLC was
asked to make or clarify policy. This process kept lower-level
officials informed of the policy norms of the principal officials
responsible for the freeze and provided collective judgment on
virtually every issue, thus building an institutional memory of
case precedent.
The staff was preoccupied, Kagan tells us, with reaching the
right result in the cases presented to it, which meant finding the
rule that the CLC would apply if the CLC were making the decision. The focus was on purposive rule interpretation, and the only
legitimate authority with respect to policy was the CLC itself.
There was no informal support for individual staffers' pursuit of
their own policy preferences. Nor did the office itself contain
competing power centers that might have developed institutional
interests and rivalries, however temporary.
True fidelity to the CLC's desires, and true consistency
within the body of rules, required that the staff pay constant
attention to the policy goals of the freeze. Within the OEP General Counsel's office, at least, Kagan assures us that the rules did
not take on a life of their own, independent of their policy foundation. In truth, however, the stringent freeze policy as formulated
by the CLC did not lend itself to much shading, 23 and the presumption in favor of stringency, coupled with time pressure, inevjustice objectives that might be inferred logically from the exceptions. The overwhelming
number of requests for exception (by rule) or exemption (of individuals or firms because
of individualized hardship) were denied. See pp. 62-64; YosHPE, supra note 3, at 96-116.
22. The behavior of the OEP General Counsel personnel supports the intuition that
consultation among colleagues engaged in administering a common set of rules is a natural
and perhaps irrepressible form of behavior. See P. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY
121-43 (rev. ed. 1963).
23. See generally pp. 99-110.
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itably pushed the OEP General Counsel's staff toward legalism. 2J
On the lever of pure description, the story of the freeze agencies may seem unexceptional, routine, a mildly interesting story
about a short-term government program that worked. The most
interesting fact for administrative-law scholars to ponder, however, is that the model of the freeze as a regime of rules was
developed mainly by nonlawyers, operating within the politicalgovernmental culture. Most of the CLC members were economists or businesspeople. The Director of the OEP, General Lincoln, was an economist by training; the design of the program
owed a great deal to ~is developed techniques of crisis management. 25 Even within the OEP General Counsel's office not all of
the professionals were lawyers. 28 It further appears that the prospect of judicial review of agency decisions had no significant effect on freeze policy. In fact, Kagan tells us that "[a]s a day-to. day inducement to legal craftsmanship and sensitivity, the close
attention of the news media was distinctly more important. " 27
Administration of the freeze took the form of a regime of rules
because a set of stringent rules, consistently applied, fitted the
program managers' requirements for efficient enforcement. 28
24. See pp. 132-33.
25. See YosHPE, supra note 3, at 27-29.
26. The General Counsel's office reached a peak strength of 28 attorneys, 11
"specialists," and 20 secretaries. YosHPE, supra note 3, at 49. The Special Assistant to the
General Counsel, who played an important role in the development of freeze policy and
in decisions on hard cases, was Major John Simpson of the United States Army, a systems
analyst by training. See p. 100 n. 1.
27. Pp. 123-25.
28. It should not surprise us that laypeople can develop and apply rules intelligently.
The legal culture is so self-absorbed, however, that lawyers occasionally forget that ration•
ality is part of the professional culture of the senior levels of government. Kagan's own
terminology unfortunately feeds the myth of the superiority of lawyers. In describing the
technique of interpreting a body of rules in a way that furthers program goals, he coins a
new usage, "the judicial mode of rule application." See p. 91. It turns out that this
technique consists of looking behind the words of a rule to see whether the substantive
outcome of a particular application of the rule is consistent with the purpose of the rule
and the overall goals of the program. While judges have been more articulate than other
professionals in interpreting rules (which is why Kagan dubs the process "the judicial
mode"), the technique is used widely by rule-applying organizations, at least at the policymaking levels. To call it "the judicial mode," however, conveys the impression that
lawyers have, if not a monopoly on the mode, at least a special expertise in it. The usage
helps perpetuate the myth that lawyers have unique authority in interpreting words in
statutes and regulations. Of course this myth is helpful to the lawyers' mystique and
consequent power within a rule-applying organization. The myth (which lawyers seem to
believe) also helps account for the surprise that lawyers themselves feel when they encounter laypeople who are skilled in rational thinking about rules. Even Kagan is surprised
when he discovers that he could see vecy little difference between the lawyers and the non-
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Legality was thus the governing principle; however, the
freeze agencies did not adhere to other conspicuous values of the
legal culture, principally those of public participation in the development of rules, care in making determinations of fact both in
disposing of individual cases and in formulating policy, and giving statements of reasons for official action.
The lack of public participation in rule formulation is easy
to understand: .the urgency of developing and implementing rules
for a ninety-day program could reasonably be thought to preclude
notice and comment. Likewise, the task of issuing explanations
for rules could reasonably be thought to produce more expenditure of resources than was justified in view of the simple nature
and brief duration of the program.
.
The agencies' casualness about factual-accuracy, however, is
slightly more troubling. Individualized wage and price advice affected not only the inquirer but also other parties to transactions
involving the wage or price at issue. Yet the process worked almost entirely ex parte. Inquiries and complaints came to the
agencies in the form of telephone calls, letters, and personal visits
from inquirers or their representatives. 29 Where the inquiry was a
request for advice, the agencies acted on the basis of facts submitted by the inquirer. Sometimes the inquiry would be accompanied by a factual presentation and argument of considerable complexity, sometimes not. Sometimes the inquiry would come
through a congressional office or administration official; occasionally the inquirer would manage to arrange a personal visit to
a freeze official. 30 However the inquiry arrived, it was decided on
lawyers he observed in their approach to rule interpretation (pp. 99-100). An earlier study
of lawyers and nonlawyers working together in a rule-making group had similarly concluded that their approaches were not significantly different, at least once the lawyers
stopped trying to monopolize the process of rule-interpretation. See V. THOMPSON, THE
REGULATORY PROCESS IN OPA RATIONING 102-04 (1950).
29. There were thousands of investigations. fu 62% of them the IRS found no violation. In most of the rest, the seller or landlord agreed to roll back the price increase. Only
214 cases were forwarded to the OEP for review; only eight lawsuits were filed, principally
because of the expense of time and resources involved in litigating cases de nova in federal
district court. fu addition, the IRS did not have subpoena power. Both Justice Department and CLC lawyers were nervous about the ability of the freeze program to withstand
challenges on constitutional- and administrative-law grounds, a fear that later proved
excessive. The result of these impediments was that "the threat of legal sanctions was the
preferred technique rather than the actual initiation of court proceedings [and] emphasis
was placed on the manipulation of such threats of legal action .••."A.WEBER, supra
note 4, at 95; see id. at 84-98 for an account of the legal enforcement effort.
30. Kagan tells us that interests that were well-organized or well-represented did not
obtain accommodative rulings more often than those that were not, even though the well-
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the basis of the unverified facts set out in the inquirer's submission, with no participation by parties who might disagree with
those factual assertions or be affected by the agency's ruling. On
the rare occasion when facts presented by an inquirer were challenged by an interested party, the OEP was unequipped and
unwilling to resolve the factual dispute. 31
This unwillingness to deal with problems of factual accuracy,
however troubling it may be to lawyers, is understandable if
viewed from the perspective of the program-managers. 32 Individualized fact determination is associated with selective government action; the freeze agencies, by contrast, were primarily interested in gross results. Making certain that individuals were not
distorting facts in their requests for advice was less important
than developing general rules, knowledge of which could be disseminated throughout the system and affect the actions of many
other parties.
The standards of official behavior that actually controlled
the administration of the freeze arose unmistakably out of the
political-governmental culture rather than the legal culture. Yet,
in general, it is clear that the program-managers' need for efficient administration, the public's vernacular understanding of
the concept of "fairness," and the legal culture's ideal of rationality all pushed in the same direction. In agencies with more complex missions and longer time horizons, they nearly always pull
apart. Indeed, they had begun to pull apart as the stabilization
program entered its second phase, which is beyond the scope of
Kagan's book.
The freeze experience is a meteor in the history of the administrative process, but its light throws into relief our previous understanding of administrative agencies with more complex proorganized or well-represented could command the attention of higher-level officials. Their
superior advocacy and access were more than offset by the visibility of any concession that
might be made to them (pp. 157-61).
31. See pp. 128-32.
32. If the program had been of longer duration, it probably would have been forced
to develop more procedural regularity. The lawyers would have encouraged the program
managers to allow public comment on the rules and to be more careful in accepting the
truth of facts conveyed ex parte. Compare pp. 123-25. Weber's final judgment was that
the system worked because the task generated a sense of importance and dedication
that is rare in large bureaucracies. Essentially, the administrative system did the
job because it was not ensnared in procedures that often constrain normal governmental activities. The structure that was designed would have proven too cumbersome and diffuse to operate effectively over a long period.
A. WEBER, supra note 4, at 35.
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gram missions and more permanent institutional interests. This
simple tale about a simple program reminds us that regulatory
purpose and structure are at least as important as law in influencing the degree to which an agency will be inclined toward legality
in its decision-making.
Kagari has written a good book. Regulatory Justice should go
onto the short list of essential works on the administrative process. What it lacks in complexity of subject matter it more than
makes up in theoretical insight and bibliographical reference.
Kagan is scrupulous in locating the freeze experience against the
background of existing jurisprudential and social learning. on the
administrative process. The book is a concise and thoughtful
guide to the literature. It is honest and careful, a model of its
genre. It should not, however, be taken for what it is not. It is not
a history of the freeze; nor is it an explanation of the total process
of freeze policy formulation and enforcement. The General Counsel's office of the OEP was only a small part of the operation, and
Kagan barely hints at the rest of the activities of the freeze agencies. What he gives us, however, is of exceptionally high quality.
We can hope that he will continue to do work of this kind. It is
badly needed.

